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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
constitutional. This is brought out by the result reached
in People v. Graves,24 where the Court of Appeals of New
York found a sixteen year retroactive tax on income re-
ceived from foreign realty to be a denial of due process.
ERNEST J. WEIss, JR.
Possession And Recording Under Conditional
Sales Contracts
Mohr v. Sands1
Plaintiff, Mrs. A, a resident of Baltimore City, entered
into an agreement to purchase a new 1955 Nash automobile
from B Corporation, located in Baltimore County, on June
6, 1955, under a conditional sales contract. The contract
was assigned for value to plaintiff, C Credit Corporation,
and recorded among the Chattel Records of Baltimore City
on June 9, 1955. C Credit Corporation was unaware that
Mrs. A was not buying the car for herself, but had per-
mitted her ex-husband to use her credit in the purchase
of the automobile, which was to be used by him as a demon-
strator during his employment as a salesman for B Cor-
poration. He was to make the down payment and monthly
installments, upon completion of which Mrs. A was to
transfer title to him, and Mrs. A testified that she never
contemplated taking possession of the car, and knew it was
to be used as a demonstrator. The Department of Motor
Vehicles issued a certificate of title for the car in Mrs. A's
name on July 27, 1955.
On July 19th, Mr. D, one of the defendants, purchased
the same automobile, which was still on display in B's
showroom, from a salesman other than Mr. A. Mr. D's
conditional sales contract was assigned for value to de-
fendant E Credit Corporation and duly recorded. On August
10th the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, acting upon a
forged application for a duplicate title and a forged assign-
ment from Mrs. A to D, and an application for a new title,
purportedly signed by D, but also stated to be forged, issued
a new title to D, showing a lien in favor of E Credit Cor-
poration.
21280 N. Y. 405, 21 N. E. 2d 371 (1939).
1213 Md. 206, 131 A. 2d 732 (1957).
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Upon discovery of the fraud, Mrs. A and C Credit Cor-
poration, contending that their recording of the conditional
sales agreement had put the defendants on constructive
notice, sought a declaratory judgment to validate their
claims to the car. The trial court ruled for the defendants,
accepting the defendants' contention that under Article
83, Section 432 the recording, though in compliance with
Article 21, Section 66,' was ineffective to give notice of
Mrs. A's rights thereunder as against a bona fide purchaser
for value. The Court of Appeals confirmed the trial court's
ruling that the recording was ineffective and accordingly
affirmed, reasoning that under Article 83, Section 43, the
defendants, being bona fide purchasers for value, were
entitled to retain their ownership and lien upon the auto-
mobile.4
The importance of this case is in the holding that the
recording statute for conditional contracts of sale is in-
applicable where the vendor remains in possession, even
though all requirements of the statute had been complied
with. The Court pointed out that the recording act con-
templated an actual delivery of the chattel, the subject of
the conditional sale, to the vendee and was enacted to pro-
tect the interests of the conditional vendor from sales by
the conditional vendee as the latter, having ostensible
ownership, was therefore able to transfer good title to
a bona fide purchaser for value.'
In reaching its decision, the Court was called upon to
review the problem of ostensible ownership as affected by
the Maryland recording statutes. Recording of bills of sale
had been required for many years, and the present form
of the statute, applicable to both bills of sale and chattel
mortgages, is found in Article 21, Section 41.6 However,
Dinsmore v. Maag-Wahmann Co.7 held that the recording
act for bills of sale had no application to a conditional sale
where posession was in the vendee, in contrast to the bill
of sale transaction where possession remains in the vendor.
2 7 MD. COD (1957) being §25, of the Uniform Sales Act:
"Where a person having sold goods continues in possession of the
goods, . . . , the delivery or transfer by that person, or by an agent
acting for him, of the goods or documents of title under any sale, pledge
or other disposition thereof, to any person receiving and paying value
for the same in good faith and without notice of the previous sale, shall
have the same effect as if the person making the delivery or transfer
were expressly authorized by the owner of the goods to make the same."
8 2 MD. CODE (1957) (formerly Art. 21 §74 of the 1951 Code).
Of. Cottman v. Wagner, 213 Md. 73, 130 A. 2d 749 (1957).
See Praeger v. Implement Company, 122 Md. 303, 89 A. 501 (1914).
2 MD. CODE (1957).
7122 Md. 177, 89 A. 399 (1914).
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Two years after the Dinsmore8 case, the first recording
statute for conditional contracts of sale was passed,9 for
the express purpose of protecting third persons who dealt
with the conditional vendee without knowledge of the
reservation of title in the vendor." Where the require-
ments of the statute were complied with by recording at
the residence of the conditional vendee and possession had
been delivered to the conditional vendee, Finance Etc. Co.
v. Truck Co."- upheld the reserved title of the vendor
against the claims of a finance company which had lent
money to a purchaser from the conditional vendee. It thus
remained for the present case to determine what law con-
trolled where the conditional vendor remained in possession
after the execution of a conditional contract of sale which
was recorded as provided for in the recording statute for
conditional sales.
Having adopted the view that the purpose of the con-
ditional sales recording statute is the protection of the
interests of purchasers from the vendee, by providing con-
structive notice through recording in the county (or city)
of the vendee's residence or place of business, the court
reached the normal conclusion that, absent some other
security device that could be recorded at the residence
or place of business of the vendor (such as a bill of sale
or chattel mortgage where the vendor or mortgagor nor-
mally remains in possession), the only applicable law was
the general rule of the Uniform Sales Act, or of common
law estoppel, both of which protect the bona fide purchaser
from the person left in possession. The Court rested its
decision flatly on the Uniform Sales Act; but, even in its
absence, the result would have been the same for the
opinion states that the Court would "have little difficulty
in finding her [Mrs. A] estopped to assert her claim to the
car .... 12
Quite suggestively, the Court points out: "Whether, in
the case of chattels so readily movable as motor vehicles,
a centralized place for the recordation of liens of all kinds
thereon should be established is a matter for legislative
'Ibid.
Its present form, somewhat changed from that originally enacted in
1916 is found In 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 21, §66.
10 Roberts & Co. v. Robinson, 141 Md. 37, 118 A. 198 (1922). Prior to the
recording act, it was held that a conditional sale was valid against all but
bona fide purchasers for value from the conditional vendee. See Praeger v.
Implement Company, 122 Md. 303, 89 A. 501 (1914).
"145 Md. 94, 125 A. 585 (1924).
'213 Md. 206, 214, 131 A. 2d 732 (1957).
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determination.' 13 Certainly, the difficulties inherent in the
instant case, which could arise in other similar cases, would
suggest the desirability of prompt legislative attention to




Attorneys' Fees - Standard For Fixing Attorneys' Fees
Under Anti-Trust Laws. Noerr Motor Freight v. Eastern
Railroad Pres. Conf., 166 F. Supp. 163 (E.D. Pa. 1958). Plain-
tiff obtained a judgment in a private action under the Sher-
man Anti-trust law. He was entitled under the statute to
treble damages ". . . and the cost of the suit including a
reasonable attorneys' fee." 15 U.S.C.A. (1951) § 15. Gen-
erally speaking, a reasonable attorneys' fee in such a judg-
ment is within the discretion of the trial court and an appel-
late court will intervene only if this discretion has been
abused. Here the District Court suggested a test in which
seven factors are to be considered in determining a reason-
able fee. These factors are: (1) whether plaintiff's counsel
had the benefit of a prior judgment or decree in a case
brought by the government; (2) the standing of counsel at
the bar - both counsel receiving the award and opposing
counsel; (3) time and labor spent; (4) magnitude and com-
plexity of the litigation; (5) responsibility undertaken; (6)
the amount recovered; and (7) the knowledge the Court
has of the conferences, arguments that were presented and
work shown by the record to have been done by attorneys
for plaintiff prior to trial. The test is then stated to be
"what, in the opinion of the Trial Judge, after considering
all the factors in the case (including but not limited to those
outlined above) would be a reasonable charge for the ser-
vices of plaintiffs' counsel?" [170].
In addition to the test stated in the present case, the
court pointed out that two other tests have been proposed.
Cape Cod Food Products v. National Cranberry Ass'n., 119
F. Supp. 242 (D.C. Mass. 1954), set forth the test as to what
constituted a reasonable attorneys' fee within the meaning
-Ibid., 214.
1 For example, Virginia has exempted liens upon motor vehicles from the
normal requirements of recording and provides for recordation of such liens
with the Department of Motor Vehicles. The liens as then noted upon the
certificate of title to the particular automobile thereby give notice through-
out the entire State. See 7 VA. CODE (1958) §46.1-69, et 8eq.
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